Firefight- Dec. 9, 1983
DMZ Era Messages posted to this BBS:
Entry: 8824 |
FIREFIGHT- DEC. 9, 1983 |
WAYNE SHELTON wrote on November 10, 2021
Plant City FL
Comments:
I was capt bonn's driver and remember this night well. We fired grenade launcher
and sniper fire. I have documentation to prove it.
Entry: 8771 |
FIREFIGHT- DEC. 9, 1983 |
RAYMOND INABNITT wrote on March 23, 2021
WEST LINN OR
Comments:
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry (MANCHU)
APO San Francisco 96251
EAIDIA-CO 12 December 1983
SUBJECT: Operational After Action Report
Commander
3d Brigade
2d Infantry Division
APO San Francisco
1. Purpose:
This report covers the actions taken by 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry the
night of 9-10 December 1983 in the US sector of the Demilitarized Zone, when
Battalion elements engaged suspected North Korean infiltrators from 2316
hrs. 9 December 1983 until 0700 hrs, 10 December 1983. It is a collation of
entries in the battalion staff journal and results obtained from a debrief
of participants conducted immediately upon their return to camp on 10
December 1983.
2. Operational Narrative:
At 2045 hrs, 9 December 1983, Guard Post Ouellette reported sighting three
individuals moving across the Military Demarcation Line at BT 97800252 at a
range of 800 meters. This sighting was made by AN/TAS-4 and AN/TAS-5 thermal
night sights. This sighting was confirmed by the Ouellette ground
surveillance radar 10 minutes later (2055 hrs). Numerous sightings continued
for two hours as the infiltrators involved moved along the lake in BT 9702.
Based upon this information the Battalion Commander directed that the Mobile
Acquisition-Counterinfiltration Element (MACE) from the Scout Platoon be
assembled.
Once the Combat Support Company Commander (CPT Keith E. Bonn) and MACE
Patrol Leader (LT Malcom MacCallum) were briefed in the TOC by the Battalion
Commander, the MACE patrol, consisting of 3 M151A2 vehicles with a total of
11 men, moved to Guard Post 128 and requested clearance to pass into the
DMZ. The mission of the MACE was to visually confirm the Ouellette spot
reports. They were to be prepared to engage on order. The MACE received
clearance to enter the DMZ at 2200 hrs and proceeded along MSR #1 to the
Guard Post Collier access road intersection, arriving at 2210 hrs.
From this location, at 2230 hrs, the MACE reported three unidentified
personnel moving east on foot on the bridge at BT 97260177. The MACE was
then instructed to move to vic pole #29 (BT 97040163, this they 22:22 CST
02/05/2018 #64454635 Submitted Electronically
did while continuing to observe the three personnel. In the meantime, two
separate observations using thermal night sites from Guard Post Ouellette
confirmed this spot as two to three personnel moving in the vicinity of the
bridge. Guard Post Collier additionally confirmed a two to three man element
at the same location.
At 2300 hrs the Battalion Commander, talking to CPT Bonn over FM radio,
inquired whether the MACE could engage. CPT Bonn responded that the target
was three personnel at 80 degrees magnetic, at 300 to 350 meters range, and
that the MACE was capable of engaging with designated marksmen and M203,
albeit at maximum range.
At 2316 hrs the Battalion Commander granted the MACE permission to engage
the target with designated marksman. The designated marksman, under CPT
Bonn’s control, engaged the target with 3 round. The designated marksman and
the scout observer operating the TOW night sight saw the targets seek cover
by moving in 3 separate directions. The TOW night sight observer continued
to observe one target who sought cover in a gully just below the bridge. At
this point CPT Bonn requested permission to engage this target with one M203
HE round. At 2318 hrs the Battalion Commander granted CPT Bonn this
permission. This round fell short and CPT Bonn requested permission for
another round which was granted. This round appeared to land on target. At
this point both the TOW night sight operator and the designated marksman
reported the targets to be running about the target area in a confused
manner. CPT Bonn requested permission to engage with a third round and
received instructions from the Battalion Commander to engage the targets as
necessary with designated marksman and M203 illumination and HE.
At 2324 hrs multiple engagements with designated marksman and M203
illumination and HE took place. At one point during this engagement the MACE
TOW night operator and designated marksman reported seeing one target run
directly into a 40mm HE explosion, fall backward, and remain motionless.
This specific incident was confirmed, in later debriefs, by TOW night sight
operators at both Guard Posts Collier and Ouellette.
Immediately after the initiation of fire, (2316 hrs) the lights on the NKPA
Guard Post #223 began to flicker on and off wildly in no perceptible
pattern. In addition, a flashing green light on the North Korean side of the
MDL was detected. Additionally, at 2325 hrs, the loudspeaker from NKPA #223
began to broadcast repeating again and again, “comeback quickly” and “hurry
back” (as translated by PVT Suh, the KATUSA translator for the MACE).
At 2326 hrs, moving targets ceased to be observed, leaving what appeared to
the night sight operators and designated marksman to be definitely one,
possibly tow motionless human body in the engagement area. This initial
engagement had lasted 10 minutes, from 2316 to 2326 hrs.
At 2346 hrs a single moving target appeared again on top of a small hill
overlooking the engagement area. The designated marksman took this target
under fire and the target went to ground immediately. In the meantime, the
Battalion Commander directed a previously organized ambush patrol from
Company A to move by patrol truck to the MACE patrol location to reinforce.
They arrived at the MACE location under the direction of LT Parker, the
Patrol Leader, at 2345 hrs. At 2353 hrs, the MACE patrol again engaged two
moving targets (observed by TOW night sight and PVS4) running near the
bridge at the 22:22 CST 02/05/2018 #64454635 Submitted Electronically
end of the lake. These targets continued to expose themselves and were
engaged several times. The TOW night sight operator reported that it
appeared that the two individuals were attempting to move to a point just
short of the suspected body as if attempting to retrieve an unidentified
piece of equipment.
At this point CPT Bonn requested permission to move with the A Company
ambush patrol into the engagement zone to secure the area. Permission was
denied. At 2400 hrs the Battalion Commander instructed CPT Bonn to move the
A Company patrol forward for better observation, but not to enter the target
area. At this time the MACE then reported that the suspected body was
located at BT 976017, and continued to engage a 1-man target in the kill
zone with their designated marksman.
After this engagement the ambush patrol moved forward with CPT Bonn to a
position on a berm approximately 100 meters from and overlooking the
engagement area. A lull followed. The patrol confirmed by thermal and
passive sights what appeared to be one, possibly two bodies in the
engagement area.
At 0014 hrs a Dragon night sight with operator from Guard Post Collier was
moved forward to this patrol to improve their ability to locally acquire
targets. A 40mm HE and illumination resupply was also effected at this time,
enabling the patrol to maintain periodic illumination of the kill zone. It
was from this position that the rest of the operation was conducted. At
periodic intervals, on order of the Battalion Commander, (now forward at GP
Collier) M203 illumination rounds were fired to keep the kill zone and
bodies under continuous observation and to discourage attempts by the enemy
to retrieve either personnel or equipment. During this period, several
moving targets in the vicinity of the engagement zone did present themselves
and were taken under fire with designated marksman and M203 HE.
At 0230 hrs the TOW night sight operators again observed targets attempting
to move down into the engagement area from the top of the hill. These were
again engaged by the designated marksman and selective M203 HE fires after
confirmation by the patrol night sights. It was also at this time that GP
Ouellette reported that all lights at NKPA GP #223 ceased activity
altogether.
At this point, approximately 0241 hrs, the GSR at GP Collier reported three
personnel moving away from vicinity Tae Song Dong enroute to the
intersection of the MSR and Ouellette access road. At 0254 hrs the MACE TOW
night operator scanning the Ouellette access road intersection identified
two mine-sized targets moving on foot at a range of 125 meters. LT McCallum,
the MACE Patrol Leader requested and was denied permission to engage. These
targets were then in turn confirmed by CPT Bonn’s element with the
designated marksman and PAS-7. At this time JSA was called and asked to
confirm the location of all its troops and Tae Song Don residents. At 0259
hrs, the MACE TOW night sight operator, still tracking targets reported the
individuals were
22:22 CST 02/05/2018 #64454635 Submitted Electronically
armed. The MACE Patrol Leader again requested permission to engage. This was
again denied by the Battalion Commander who instructed the MACE to wait
until JSA confirmed the location of its elements.
In the same area, at 0329 hrs, MACE patrol again reported personnel moving
in a 270 degree magnetic azimuth and requested permission to use
illumination, which was denied. This spot was confirmed by GP Collier at
0330 hrs, and GP Ouellette at 0337 hrs. This target was never engaged.
Meanwhile at 0342 hrs, Radar Site #4 spotted a man-sized target moving 200
meters northeast of the engagement zone at BT 980016. At 0419 hrs GP
Ouellette (with two thermal night sites) spotted a man sized target moving
towards the MDL at BT 97880280. This was followed by a report oat 0438 hrs
by RS #4 of movement at 3 locations (BT 978017, 980016, 982015) which they
had tracking since 0330 hrs.
As illumination began to run low and mist began to move into the area, at
approximately 0515, CPT Bonn directed a M203 gunner to fire illumination
directly into the underbrush near the kill zone in an effort to provide
continuous illumination of the area. On impact this round illuminated three
personnel who ran in separate directions. This movement was visually
confirmed by four patrol members in addition to several night sight
operators, these targets were engaged by numerous rounds from the designated
marksman and two M203 gunners.
Following this engagement, which lasted approximately 8 minutes, at 0532 hrs
the patrol PAS-7, designated marksman and GP Ouellette night sights
identified a man-sized target attempting to drag a large form out of the
engagement area. This target again was illuminated and engaged by M203 HE.
About this time the PAS-7 readings which had been thought to be a body or
bodies disappeared.
At 0535 hrs RS#4 spotted 6-7 targets moving at BT 988023 toward the
engagement area. Simultaneously the patrol PAS-7 picked up a large hot spot
from underneath the bridge. As no more moving targets presented themselves
periodic illumination continued. At 0553 Hrs, RS#4 reported two to three
personnel separating from the original six to seven men spotted at BT
98800209. This was followed at 0557 hrs by a GP Ouellette GSR spot of four
targets on land and 2 in the water at BT 973017 just north of the bridge.
This was confirmed by multiple TOW night sights.
At 0602 hrs the Battalion Commander directed A Company Patrol element to put
M203 HE rounds over the bridge (north) into the water beyond to interdict
the anticipated egress. AT 0605 hrs 3 personnel were spotted in the lake by
GP Ouellette and the Battalion Commander called for cease-fire as they are
out of range.
Following this, at 0640 hrs, GP Ouellette spotted 2 personnel with thermal
and passive night sights at BT 972209 within 150 meters of the GP perimeter,
The Battalion Commander authorized Ouellette to engage but no engagement
took place as no clear shot presented itself.
At 0700 hrs, the Battalion QRF moved into the DMZ and moved to the
engagement area in preparation for a sweep of the area. At 0702 hrs, GP
Ouellette reported a siren sounding at NKPA #222. At 0728 hrs, GP Collier
reported 2 to 4 personnel moving east of GP Ouellette with GSR. At 0733 hrs,
the QRF linked up with the MACE/A Company patrol and prepared to sweep the
kill zone area. The Battalion Commander authorized the sweep to begin at
0805 hrs. 22:22 CST 02/05/2018 #64454635 Submitted Electronically
The sweep was conducted with elements of the QRF and two additional patrols
from Company A. The sweep was conducted from the kill zone northeast along
the northern and southern banks of the lake to within 100 meters of the MDL.
The sweep uncovered numerous footprints from flat-soled footgear throughout
the engagement zone and four broken-bush type trails leading both northeast
and down to the lake. No blood, bodies or any other evidence was uncovered.
Divers form 2nd Engineer Battalion were also requested and arrived at
Battalion Headquarters at approximately 1100 hrs. Following a briefing by
the Battalion Commander they were linked up with a security element from the
QRF company and entered the DMZ with the objective of conducting a
reconnaissance of the lake. They were requested to determine whether the
lake was a possible avenue of approach, and to look for any evidence that
might corroborate the events of the previous night. They confirmed that the
lake is chest deep at its deepest point except near its western end near the
dam where it gets deeper. The lake is therefore wadeable from the MDL to the
dam. They identified footprints leading into the water in the vicinity of
the engagement area, and subsequently identified footprints leading out of
the lake at it northeastern edge where it leads into North Korea. In
addition, they identified footprints and drag marks under the surface of the
water in the shallow areas at both ends of the lake.
3. Conclusions. In summary the following conclusions are offered:
First, there was very definitively an infiltration attempt of the US sector
by what is believed to have been a three man team. To believe otherwise one
must discount not only the quality of our night sights and radar, but also
the quality and training of the soldiers manning them. Enclosure 2 shows 21
detections within the US sector, 18 of which were confirmed by three
sources: ground surveillance radar, passive night observation devices and
thermal sights. Additionally, there are the numerous foot prints and trails
uncovered by the followup patrols.
Secondly, once engaged this team either suffered casualties or lost
equipment. Otherwise, it is felt the team would not have stayed in the area
for as long as it did. Likewise, there were the passive and thermal night
sight spottings of “a body” and sightings of individual dragging something
into the lake. It may also be that the attempts to recover either personnel
or equipment were assisted by additional infiltrators moving into the area,
perhaps only to create a diversion.
The infiltration team used the lake vicinity BT 9702 as an avenue of
approach and as an escape route. This is evidenced by numerous sightings of
personnel in and around the lake by both GP Ouellette and GP Collier, using
both night sights and radar. Additionally, a reconnaissance of the lake
conducted by 2nd Engineer Battalion divers discovered foot prints and what
appeared to be “drag marks” going into and out of the lake on both north and
south ends.
Finally, the presence of unidentified infiltrators is supported by sporadic
flashing of lights from NK GP 222, the detection of a green flashing signal
22:22 CST 02/05/2018 #64454635 Submitted Electronically
light from the MDL and by the loudspeaker broadcasts at the time of
engagement it “comeback.” Additionally, a propaganda broadcast monitored by
a battalion patrol on 10 December is reported to have said, “If you fire on
us again, we will retaliate.
C.D. McMillin
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry
Commanding
2 Enclosures
1 - Sketch of Engagement Area
2 - Infiltrator “Spots” Map 22:22 CST 02/05/2018 #64454635 Submitted
Electronically
Entry: 8767 |
FIREFIGHT- DEC. 9, 1983 |
RAYMOND INABNITT wrote on March 17, 2021
WEST LINN OR
Comments:
Email me and I'll send the AAR from the BN CDR to you
Entry: 7092 |
FIREFIGHT- DEC. 9, 1983 |
JOHNNY ONEAL wrote on December 7, 2016
Asher Oklahoma
Comments:
I was in A Co. 1/9 at Camp Liberty Bell, DMZ Korea. I need
buddy statements that will verify that a firefight took
place on Dec.9 ,1983. The US Army says it did not happen,
but we know better. If you could help me out I would be very
grateful. Thanks
Dedicated To - Arthur Donald DeLacy - 1st Lieutenant - USMCR - MIA POW - 10/07/1951 - Heartbreak Ridge