18th Fighter-Bomber Wing in Korea

KWANGJU CROSSING --FRIEND OR FOE ... The Critical Unknown Factor”

Kwangju, South Korea, Late July, 1950

The city of Taejon fell to the Communists on July 22, 1950, the same day that Typhoon Gloria's low ceilings caused our few airplanes to stand down. Hundreds of our Army troops were captured, including Major General Dean. I don't know how much difference our efforts would have made, had we been able to fly that one day; we couldn't stop the advance, certainly, but maybe we could have allowed our troops a little more of a fighting chance to regroup. It was a very sad, frustrating feeling; there was so much we could do, if only there were more of us, and if we had more planes ...or more hours in each day ...if, if, if....!

Taejon's capture marked a successful milestone for the North Korean's western forces, and made it possible for them to effect a risky end-around advance along the weakly-defended western and southern coasts of the peninsula and, at the same time, continuing their steady advance down the east coast with their third force.

I became directly involved with the end-around flanking movement on the west coast, but because of our inadequate communications ...as well as too few airplanes to cover too much war, we failed to slow the Communist advance as we should have. "Had we only known ... things might have been different!"

A Navy Lieutenant had come into my Intelligence tent on that rainy day that Taejon fell, pleading with me to send some fighter support over to the west coast, beyond Taejon. He said he'd just come from there by road, and the Red troops were crossing the river estuary in small craft. If they weren't stopped then, while still vulnerable in their little boats, they would reach the south shore and be able to sweep through the city of Kwangju and the whole southwestern end of the country. I felt very badly, not being able to help him; but we couldn't possibly fly in the existing weather, and at that time didn't even know the status of our primary area of concern ... Taejon. I told him I'd try to get someone into that area to look over the situation as soon as the weather broke enough to get our ships into the air.

Early the following day, flying armed reconnaisance alone on my next mission, I attacked troops and tanks southeast of Taejon with my bombs and rockets, then swung wide northwest of Kwangju, to look for signs of boats crossing the western estuary; I could see none at the time, but as I flew low over the road leading south toward Chongjun, about thirty miles south of the estuary crossing, I ran across ten olive-drab, open-backed trucks loaded with armed troops ...they were southbound Were they North or South Korean troops? I had no way to know!

When I made a second, very low, slow pass to look them over, the men in the trucks displayed white cloth signal panels on the roof of the trucks' cab....even though panel codes had not yet been established that early in the war. The trucks were headed south, not north. I was certain that they were enemy troops ...why else would they be heading south, and the Navy officer had said they were crossing ... ten truck loads, about 200 men. They were sitting ducks for my machine guns ...it would have been a simple matter for me to halt them all in a matter of minutes. BUT I DID NOT DARE FIRE ON THEM!

There was no way to be absolutely sure that they weren't friendly troops, so I did not strafe. After two more low, slow passes, all the while trying desperately to find a giveaway clue to their true identities, I gave up and flew on southeastward toward Masan at low level. I saw no other troop movements of any kind, so turned back north to our base at Taegu.

When I filed my mission report with 5th Air Force after landing, I learned that there were NO FRIENDLY TROOPS in the area where I'd found the convoy. The troops I had seen were the spearhead of the advance that the Navy Lieutenant had told me about. I could have stopped it, or at least slowed if for awhile ... if only I had known... if, if.

Troop identification was a continuing, serious ... nay, "Critical" problem during those hectic, early days when the battle lines were changing from minute to minute. Our normal tactics, when operating in support of ground troops, would have included the use of bright-colored cloth panels displayed on the ground according to a "code of the day". But, because there was no communications yet established with the ground troops, they used the only colored panels available ..white, and they were displayed by both the friendly and the enemy forces. It was a continuing, confusing mess. Kwangju, the major city on the southwest interior, fell just a few days after Taejon. We were amazed at the speed and ease with which the Communists were able to take territory. Although we kept a daily reconnaissance over the areas, and found plenty of targets, we were able to slow down their advance hardly at all. How sorry I was that I hadn't been able to identify those first ten truck loads of troops ...things might have been different in the south.

The main Communist thrust, down the west-central route to Taejon, had then swung eastward to follow the road and railroad corridor toward Waegwan, planning to cross the Naktong River to envelop Taegu. In just a matter of days, the war situation became desperate for the U. N. forces. By the end of July our ground troops around Yongdong had managed to fight only enough of a delaying action to slow the thrust aimed at Taegu. Most of our close support bombing and strafing was concentrated in that area, close to our front (or 'rear') lines, and we were pleased with the reports from ground troops on how much damage our strikes were doing.

Along those lines, however, some of those Army troops became pretty "itchy-fingered".

One afternoon, while I was trying to locate a certain road junction between Taejon and the Naktong River, where the enemy was supposed to have some camouflaged tanks hidden, I had to carefully study my map to be sure I didn't hit the wrong area. While concentrating on the map, I climbed to about 8000 feet while circling back toward where I knew our friendly forces were grouped; I didn't want a bunch of unfriendly people on the ground shooting at me while I had my head in the cockpit. Every once in awhile I'd dip a wing to look over the terrain, trying to locate the road junction I was looking for.

Finally, I guess my actions became too suspicious for our artillery troops below; they must have thought I was about to drop on them, so just to make sure, they cut loose with about six rounds of heavy "communications flak", which exploded right at my altitude, but a couple hundred yards off to the side. I 'got the message' ... I moved out of their area to do my checking.

Major "Moon" Mullins, commander of the 67th Squadron, following the death of Major Lou Sebille, had the terrible misfortune several weeks later, to lead an aerial attack which killed about 20 Australian ground troops, simply because the spotter plane pilot misread the identification panel signals.

Radio direction of the Fighters by air and ground observers became the most reliable communication, once the systems were established. Lt. Colonel John R. Murphy, FEAF Headquarters, had flown over to Korea to assist in the evacuation of U.S. civilians and to see what help was needed when the invasion began. He was caught on the ground when his C-54 evacuation transport was shot up by Red fighters, so he joined the retreat south toward Taejon. Along the way he acquired a radio jeep and took it upon himself to start directing nearby fighter air attacks as "Angelo Control", our first Forward Air Control unit of the war.

When Taejon fell to the enemy, Murphy stayed with the rear-guard to furnish identification for our fighter planes, and to direct them onto enemy targets. He finally brought his radio jeep into Taegu City and served as attack controller to direct our flights to the area where they were most needed to provide air support to the beleaguered Army troops. It was a primitive, overworked system, but it was a start, until "Mellow Control"... a better equipped Tactical Air Control Center unit could move in and take over. * ( Lt Col. John R. Murphy stayed on at Taegu to run the Tactical Control Center operation, and would frequently fly strike missions on this reporter's wing ... he liked the way I exercised evasive action when approaching or leaving the target, so no one could get a good lead shot at us. Years later, in 1954, we met again when he was commanding the All-Weather Interceptor base at Perrin AFB, Texas, and I was a student in one of their F-86D All-weather Interceptor classes.

He finally retired as a Lieutenant General after a long and highly successful Air Force career, and resides in San Antonio, TX.)

Each day, from before dawn until long after dark, whenever there was enough light to see targets on the ground, we kept our meager 12th Squadron Fighter forces going. As the lines drew nearer, each mission got shorter. By July 26th, 1950 we had more targets on the roads than we could handle ...tanks, and hundreds of trucks loaded with enemy troops and supplies.

They were moving so fast that they wouldn't take time to stop and establish defensive positions; as a consequence... and fortunately for us, they had no heavy anti-aircraft armament at the front with them, just rifles, .50 cal machine guns and a few 40 mm cannon. We took a heavy toll whenever and wherever we found them ...on every flight, but we could carry only two 500 pound bombs or two napalm "fire" bombs, six 5 inch rockets, and many hundreds of rounds of .50 caliber ammunition for our six wing guns.

We could stop the tanks only with our napalm, or a direct hit with our 500 pounders, and could wipe out dozens of trucks, locomotives or rail cars with our rockets and machine guns. But as soon as we ran out of ammunition and had to leave a "hot" target area, the Reds would pick up and get on the move again. Their troop losses must have been astronomical, but they kept advancing.

By 3 August, 1950, the North Korean forces were massing on the west shore of the Naktong River, preparatory to crossing of the summer-shallow stream .... while at the same time, their north-central thrust pressed against the low hills immediately to the North just fourteen short miles from our final bastion of air support: Taegu's busy airstrip.

Duane E. 'Bud' Biteman,
Lt. Col, USAF, Ret
‘...One of those Old, Bold Fighter Pilots’
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