Date: Mon, 25 May 1998 18:31:50 EDT
From: Carl Bernard Email address

Thank you very much for the Reverend Holmes' discussion for this 
Memorial Day. My own thoughts were written for "Love" Company, 21st Infantry.

Please share with your friends.  I'm not sure that I told you that I 
was in "K" Company from January 1950 to April 1950.
And as we say to one another: keep the faith.

Carl Bernard
__________________________


"Love" Company, 21st Infantry, 30+18 (years) Afterwards.

This "Love" affair began just 48 years ago for me,  an infantry 2nd
Lieutenant with four years enlisted time, part of it in the 7th  Marines
and the rest in the Army’s 82nd Airborne.  "Love" Company was in Camp 
Wood, at Kumamoto on Kyushu in Japan. The remnants of this outfit and
those who joined us in our first year in Korea just assembled in Myrtle
Beach, South Carolina for the 18th consecutive year. 

Our company commander began his service as a National Guardsman in the 
36th Infantry Division ("T for Texas") in WWII.  He was wounded twice 
with them; two of his brothers were also killed with this stand-out lot
of soldiers.

Almost 600 men went through "Love" Company during this first year. 102 
were KIA, and more than 200 were wounded at least once.  38 of the 43
captured died in prison camp after we used up our ammunition to "hold 
at all costs" a meaningless bit of ground. The 20 of us at Myrtle Beach
know, as one of us wrote, that: "War is an intensely personal thing.  
For the individual infantryman, war seldom extends more than a few 
yards. 

Because of this, rarely will two soldiers agree on what took place in a
given battle or engagement, unless they were foxhole buddies.  Much of 
what is recounted has to be taken with the knowledge that what you hear
is not necessarily what you saw or felt at the time.  What you hear is a
part of the person telling his tale, part of his vision, part of his
hearing, part of his thinking, yes even a part of his soul."  

Everything any of us say about what  happened to us in the past is
conditioned by, and must be heard with this reality.  Example: it is 
certain that few of us knew the same old soldier (29!) who joined us on
the Naktong as First Sergeant.  He passed this year; my enclosed letter
to his widow says what he was for me, by then the only  original officer
still about. (The other living one was in Tiger’s Camp.)

As a parachutist, I had helped load the C-54s transporting the members 
of Task Force Smith, the battalion (-) from the 21st Infantry flown to 
Korea on July 1st, 1950 to stop the North Korean attack. LtC Brad Smith,
said: "stay on the plane."  

We failed in this first mission for a variety of reasons, in large part
because they were an overwhelming force of skilled, well trained and 
well equipped soldiers exploiting the momentum  of their successes 
against poorly equipped South Koreans. (These Koreans’ "poor equipment,"
i.e., no armor, was to keep their President, Syngman Rhee, from 
attacking north to accomplish his cherished hope: reuniting the two 
Koreas.)  

The driving Army slogan of a few years ago, "No More Task Force Smiths"
misleads people.  Our problems as a fighting force in 1950 were not 
because we were diverted by our "occupation" duties.  The entire Army in
Japan was an under-trained, unorganized force of badly led men, whose
inadequate equipment was missing and/or badly maintained.  Personnel 
moved constantly in and out of various postings in Japan; and combat 
units live on people knowing and trusting (loving) one another. Knowing
takes time; cohesion, a critical word in a soldier’s lexicon takes a 
lot of it.  My platoon in TFS was my fourth in the Regiment in less than
ten months. (After my three day walk away from the fight at Osan, I went
directly back to "Love" company like a shot, and without authorization.

Our splendid Texan commanding officer and all the other officers, and 
all the NCOs, but one--were killed or captured three days later with 
most of our outfit, following that obscene "hold at all costs" order
given by our very ignorant chiefs.)

Our Army is yet traumatized by the failure of its "occupation" troops 
from Japan to be a successful fighting force when they were deployed to
Korea. This concern is characterized by the amount of time everyone
pronounces it will take to "retrain" forces posted to OOTW (Operations 
Other Than War) missions before they can take on the usual role of 
combat soldiers.

The concern itself is real; the rationale behind it is false, or at best
questionable.  My objection to its exaggerated place in our concerns is
personal and based on reflection about my early experience in Korea.  

Our egregious failures were those of our unconscious high command.  Our
infantry anti-tank rocket had proved itself a failure to the 82nd 
Airborne on Sicily seven years earlier. General Gavin still the 82nd’s
commander when I joined them in 1947 was burying parachutists with this
piece of trash ground up in their bodies in 1943! (The tracks of a tank
are a powerful psychological weapon for very good reasons.) The 
bazooka’s  replacement was adequate, but was not in the hands of the 
troops.  

There were adequate tanks in the States; our division had the M-24 
Chaffee, a light reconnaissance vehicle thought to be a tank by our 
innocent soldiers, fooled by its shape.   Its’ outfit was even called 
the 78th Heavy Tank Battalion (emphasis added).  Two of "Love’s"
replacements came from this outfit after it was destroyed by North 
Koreans, unimpressed by the shape of its vehicles and the units "heavy"
label. 

None of us will ever forget "Sleeping Bag Hill."  Our seasoned and
competent company bore the brunt of an attack by a Chinese Regiment, a
central component of their "Fourth Offensive."  We held the ground they
regarded as crucial to take.  Our cost was horrendous, properly
characterized as  "the second, final death of a rifle company," sadly 
ours. The 16 men KIA and the 65 WIA, many seriously, crippled the unit,
according to those still on hand.  Fortunately, our fight and that of 
the 23rd Regiment at Chipyong-ni helped make negotiations based on the
ground held, more welcome to all concerned.

Do not accept the myth that soldiers will fail in combat if they are
assigned other duties beforehand.  They will fail if the Army’s senior
commanders are time-servers striving for promotion, who do not 
understand the responsibilities of their offices.  Troop leaders 
properly guiding their subordinates and making them understand how peace
keeping is done and why, will have an adequately cohesive force. 

They will be as able to fight well as one that has rigorously followed
TRADOC’s various schedules.  Leadership and unit cohesion are far more
important for real fighters, and are not accomplished by simply 
following a prescribed training regime. 

In any case, today’s Army has OOTW to accommodate and it can be done.  
This includes learning to fight in cities, as the Marine Corps is now
practicing.

Do not buy the concerns of those dedicated to half-understood myths and
ignorant of our Army’s actual history.  Properly prepared peace-keepers
can fight. All of us must insist on our forces preparing for the 
missions of today; these demand an understanding of who we are, how to 
fight and following the "art" of Sun Tsu: how to win without fighting.

The proper relation to one another of soldiers in a fighting unit is in
our Company’s name: Love.  This emotion endures as our seance in Myrtle
Beach illustrated once again.  Our bond holds.  It is what made us 
effective despite the enormous price many of us paid.  Each of the
"antiques" who were at Myrtle Beach  is a witness to what "warrior" 
means, and how they are formed. We were all warriors during our time. 
"Love" Company’s fights, not all victorious, are an integral part of 
each of us; knowing one another is a just reward for our having "kept 
the faith."  

And much more love to each of you.

Carl Bernard 

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