The Korean War Revisited

Date: Thu, 19 Oct From: susanm@cruzio.com (Susan Marfield)
Subject: Korean War Revisited
Organization: Cruzio Community Networking System, Santa Cruz, CA
From: Charles A. Callahan Col. USAF(Ret)
machanudo@aol.com

To whom it may concern,

Conventional wisdom recognizes that the war in Korea (1950-1953) was the first war we lost. B. Alexander affirms this judgement his title and text, "Korea, the first war we lost" which is based on his reconstruction and his interpretation of "what happened" from records and anecdotal sources available to him. He is not alone in his judgement. But, the conventional wisdom stigmatizes hundreds of thousands of good soldiers and dedicated commanders who performed all their duties well and honorably -- and they did not lose. Conventional wisdom ignores the extraordinary performance of those troops under the command of General Matthew B. Ridgway. Consider the record:

In the five years before the war in Korea, dissention and confusion in the councils of government, uncertainty over the role of atomic weapons and shrinking budgets combined to conduct conditions of "readiness" to near zero in the U.S. Army and Tactical Air Forces.

Commanders and planners were left to answer their own questions: What kind of wars should we be ready for? Political answer: "All kinds. You figure it out." What kind and degree of "readiness" will Congress pay for? Political answer: "Thirteen billion dollars. You figure it out."

Chinese intervention in Korea was preceded by precarious situations of unprepared, unequipped and unsupplied Eighth Army forces in combat defending against the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) marauding through South Korea. When those conditions were ended by the Master Stroke of the Inchon Invasion, over-confidence characterized the attitudes of Commanders of UN Forces. General MacArthur pursued the beaten NKPA into North Korea and, ultimately, was trapped there by the Communist Chinese Forces (CCF).

On 25 October 1950: The Eighth Army, poised in the northwestern peninsula of Korea, threatening to occupy the Yalu River boundaries with China, was driven backwards twelve miles to the Chongchon River line in North Korea by the CCF "First Offensive."

28 October 1950: In the northeastern part of the peninsula, the same CCF "First Offensive" provoked a counter attack by the Seventh Marine Regiment that scattered the CCF forces through the Chosin Reservoir area and left the Marines deployed in a long column with flanks exposed along their line of march.

24 November 1950: Eighth Army, in northwestern Korea, mounted an offensive to regain positions lost one month earlier and again to establish momentum of its forces to gain the Yalu. The next day, 25 November, the CCF launched the "Second CCF Offensive" that drove Eighth Army backwards fifty miles to the 38th parallel.

27 November 1950: The same "CCF Second Offensive", two days later in northeastern Korea, in the X Corps sector, turned back the attack by the 1st Marine Division at the Chosin Reservoir. After gallant and extremely difficult withdrawal of the Marines and others from the CCF trap at the Chosin Reservoir, on 24 December 1950 X Corps evacuated North Korea.

31 December 1950: The "Third CCF Offensive" drove Eighth Army (all UN Forces) back from the 38th Parallel to positions south of the Han River.

This withdrawal of UN Forces abandoned forward airbases which were essential for our continued air engagement with enemy Mig-15s and for continuation of the assault by air weapons on CCF troops, movements and resupply. Then, in a tactical maneuver, Eighth Army withdrew further to approximately the 37th Parallel. At this time, when the bases for Fifth Air Force weapons of limited range were displaced from their target areas, the CCF gained six weeks of respite from an extended air campaign that had limited the effectiveness of the CCF's logistic systems operations. The CCF marshalled 650 combat aircraft near the Yalu and threatened to seize air superiority in North Korea. This situation brought the presence of UN Forces in Korea to its nadir.

January 1951: L/Gen. M. Ridgway had assumed Command of Eighth Army and UN Forces under his command. Gen. Ridgway initiated, managed, and maneuvered a complex campaign of critical battles that turned the tide of war in Korea: Ridgway's first "Campaign of Fifty Days" (06 January - 18 February 1951) was the basis for the Eighth Army's (and UN's) success thereafter in the Korean War.

05 January to 10 February: Reorganized Eighth Army regained the Han River by a series of deliberately controlled advances utilizing coordinated arms and disciplines.

11 February 1951: The "Fourth CCF Offensive" engaged all Eighth Army (UN) Divisions from the western part of the peninsula to the central mountains and concentrated five CCF Armies in the central area of Wonju. Eighth Army

(UN) units advanced or held their positions along the entire front and turned the tide of the war after a month of complex maneuvers and critical battles (without participation of the 1st Marine Division) that culminated in the battle at Chipyong-ni on 13-15 February.

The CCF never again won a major battle in Korea.

25 February to 21 April: Eighth Army (UN Forces) supported by Air Forces, and now including the 1st Marine Division, conducted a series of limited objective offensives that secured tactical positions above the 38th Parallel. This situation enabled the functions of forward bases for air weapons at Kimpo (K14) Seoul (K16) and Suwon (K13) and extended radar coverage northward beyond the Yalu. Fifth Air Force again engaged the Migs when they appeared in skies over Korea and all of our tactical aircraft resumed day and night assault of CCF troops, movements and supply facilities through all of North Korea. The CCF lost forever its chance for air superiority in North Korea.

22 April: The CCF launched its "Fifth Offensive" with 250,000 men in 27 Divisions along a forty mile front. By 30 April, Eighth Army (UN Forces) contained that CCF offensive north of Seoul and north of the Han River with severe losses to the CCF.

16 May to 20 May: The CCF launched their last, desperate "Sixth Offensive" concentrated in the central and eastern mountains. Although the CCF penetrated 20 miles into the territory defended in the East by the Republic of Korea Army, it could not hold or exploit its gains and withdrew badly beaten and exhausted.

22 May to 16 June: The counter attack of Eighth Army (UN Forces) drove the CCF and NKPA out of South Korea. As of 25 June 1951 casualty statistics were: CCF: 600,000 (dead, wounded, captured) NKPA: 600,000 (dead, wounded, captured) ROK civilians: 469,000 (170,000 dead) ROK Army: 212,554 (21,625 dead) U.S.: 78,800 (21,300 dead - presumed KIA)

In June 1951, Eighth Army (UN Forces) possessed, in the Iron Triangle, controlling positions in Kumhwa and Chorwon. Eighth Army held the Hwachon Reservoir. After battles in July for "Bloody Ridge" (2700 UN casualties) and "Heartbreak Ridge" (3700 U.S. Second Division casualties), in August 1951 it controlled the "Punchbowl." Those are very nearly the positions held by UN Forces when the Cease Fire was finally arranged two years later and after an additional 12,329 U.S. KIA. (Totaled U.S. deaths in the Korean War were 54,240. Of this total, 20,617 were accounted to accidents, disease and other).

The war of maneuver was over in August 1951: The war of attrition went on for two more years behind elaborate defenses in depth; mine fields, concertina, trenches, foxholes, bunkers, artillery, and AAA until July 1953.

Neither side intended to conquer the other. Each change of territorial positions for propaganda purposes punished both sides with heavy casualties while negotiations for an armistice were protracted by the tyranny of South Korean President Singman Rhee and the intransigence of the Communist Powers.

U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy colored our performance in Korea a shameful loss caused by The Communist Conspiracy which, he claimed, existed and conducted policy in our U.S. Government.

It is long past time to appraise again the performance of the U.S. soldier and his officers, commanders and colleagues including airmen and the invincibly competent Marines in the war in Korea.

Charles A. Callahan Albuquerque, NM

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